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A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration
by Lisa Heinzerling and Rena I. Steinzor
Unprecedented Events
In October 1991, four separate weather systems gathered off
the coast of New England: Hurricane Grace from the Atlantic, a cold front from New England, a high pressure system
over southeastern Canada, and a low pressure system in the
Maritimes.1 When they converged, they created a storm as
strong as any in recorded history, with winds of 120 miles
per hour and waves the height of 10-story buildings. The interaction of the weather systems was so rare and its effects
so cataclysmic, meteorologists dubbed the results “the perfect storm.” No one caught in the middle of such a phenomenon could survive.
For an Administration hostile to environmental protection, suspicious of regulation in virtually any form, and devoted to the short-term interests of the energy and chemical
industries, the circumstances surrounding its decisions in
December 2003 to forego meaningful controls on mercury
air emissions from power plants and mercury cell chlor-alkali facilities amounted to the regulatory equivalent of the
perfect storm.2 Four separate policy frameworks—science,
law, economics, and justice—combined to create huge pressure in favor of strict and swift controls.
As for science, the threat to public health posed by widespread methyl mercury (MeHg) contamination of the human food chain is recognized by every body of scientific experts that has considered the question. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) concluded in 2000 that the children
of women who eat fish and shellfish regularly during pregLisa Heinzerling is a professor at the Georgetown Law Center. She is the
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the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing (The New
Press, forthcoming 2004). She thanks Trevor Wiessmann for excellent research assistance. Rena I. Steinzor is a professor at the University of Maryland School of Law. She is working on a longer analysis of the policies
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1. For a popular account, see Sebastian Junger, The Perfect
Storm (1997).
2. Proposed National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; and, in the Alternative, Proposed Standards of Performance for
New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam-Generating Units; Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 4652 (Jan. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Proposed Power Plant Rule]; National Emission Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Mercury Emissions From Mercury
Cell Chlor-Alkali Plants; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 70904 (Dec. 19,
2003) [hereinafter Final Chlor-Alkali Rule].

nancy are at risk of permanent neurological damage.3 The
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has assembled statistics showing that 8% of American women of child-bearing
age have levels of mercury in their bloodstreams that could
harm their unborn children.4 As this Article went to press,
the Washington Post reported that a new government
analysis has nearly doubled—to 630,000—the estimated
number of newborn children at risk because of unsafe levels of mercury in their blood.5 Unless children and their
mothers eliminate fish from their diets, this damage will
continue indefinitely.
As for law, the Clean Air Act’s (CAA’s) provisions requiring technology-based regulation were automatically
triggered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA’s) December 2000 finding that it was appropriate and
necessary to regulate mercury from power plants. The same
provisions also mandate that mercury emissions from
chlor-alkali plants should be eliminated in favor of better
technologies that forego the use of mercury altogether.
Economics reinforced the law and the science. Regarding
power plants, for example, economic analysis showed that
the benefits of regulating mercury—even if one considered
only the ancillary benefits that come when other pollutants
are reduced as a result of mercury controls—overwhelm the
costs. Finally, basic principles of justice cried out for protection of the especially vulnerable groups of people—chil3. National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences (NAS), Toxicological Effects of Methyl Mercury 9
(2000), available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook/0309071402/
html/index.html [hereinafter 2000 NAS Report].
4. Centers for Disease Control (CDC), First National Report on Human Exposure to Environmental Chemicals 18
(2001) (reporting that approximately 10% of women of child-bearing age have mercury levels within one-tenth of the reference dose
(RfD) that is associated with an increase in abnormal scores on cognitive function tests among children); CDC, Second National
Report on Human Exposure to Environmental Chemicals
19 (2003) (confirming these estimates and reporting that non-Hispanic white children ages 1-5 years old had lower blood mercury levels than either non-Hispanic blacks or Mexican Americans and that
mercury levels in non-Hispanic black women between the ages of
16-49 were higher than levels in non-Hispanic whites and Mexican
Americans). Both reports are available at http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/
dls/ner.htm. The 8% figure refers to women who have levels at or
above the RfD—as opposed to the 10% who have levels more of less
than one-tenth of the RfD. It was reported by EPA on the basis of the
CDC statistics. U.S. EPA, America’s Children and the Environment (2003) (EPA 240-R-03-001) [hereinafter EPA
Children’s Health Report].
5. Guy Gugliotta, Mercury Threat to Fetus Raised, EPA Revises Risk
Estimates, Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 2004, at A3.
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dren, pregnant women, communities that rely on fish for
subsistence—harmed by mercury emissions.
Rarely does one see all of these fundamental and powerful forces—science, law, economics, and justice—work together so perfectly, all at once, to create an enormous momentum for good and timely regulation.
Although all those who watched this awesome system develop over the last decade expected the Bush Administration to search for routes around the storm, none were prepared for its headlong plunge into the tallest waves. The Administration simply refused to impose meaningful controls
on industrial sectors that together produce the lion’s share of
mercury now poisoning fish across the country. So audacious is the Administration’s effort that it has pushed beyond the envelope of what had passed for legitimate disagreements between conservatives, moderates, and progressives regarding the future direction of the nation’s environmental and public health policies. We have reached a
new plateau, where a new game is being played, and we
would all do well to acknowledge that we do not yet understand the implications of these radically different rules.
At this turning point in the history of our efforts to control
environmental pollution, it remains to be seen whether the
Bush Administration’s astounding effort to avoid the clear
implications of science, law, economics, and justice will be
successful. If it is, the Administration will not only have survived, it will have turned the storm’s overwhelming force
back on the public, leaving parents and children to fend for
themselves and changing for the foreseeable future the
ground rules that apply to such decisions.
This Article, the first of a two-part series, begins with a
discussion of MeHg’s impact on public health. In the course
of this discussion, it considers scientific and technical justifications for the Bush Administration’s policies, as advanced by conservative commentators. This Article also explains the building blocks of the Administration’s emerging
policy on mercury: its decision to embrace market-based air
emissions trading in lieu of pollution control requirements
for coal- and oil-burning power plants and its decision to
forego meaningful controls on mercury cell chlor-alkali
plants. The second part of the Article, to be published in the
June 2004 issue of the Environmental Law Reporter (ELR),
will consider the Administration’s hasty and one-sided effort to apply cost-benefit analysis to its trading decision, as
well as the implications for public health and environmental
justice of allowing companies to indulge in unrestricted
trades of such an extremely toxic substance.
Because we are committed to a thorough analysis of the
reasoning that motivates the creators of the Administration’s misguided mercury policies, we have searched high
and low for possible justifications of these decisions. This
written documentation can be sorted into three categories:
(1) remarkable statements from conservative commentators
to the effect that MeHg is not a threat to public health and
that, even if it is, American power plants are not a significant
source of the problem; (2) broad claims by Administration
officials that their decisions will accomplish better, or at
least equivalent, results for less money; and (3) highly technical, bureaucratic rationales for the chosen actions. Each is
considered below and in part two of this series. Not surprisingly, we conclude that these rationales do not hold up,
whether evaluated factually or on the basis of their intrinsic
logic. Something else must be going on.
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That something else is nothing more—nor less—than a
decision to relieve the burden on industry regardless of the
impact on public health. Meaningful opportunities to control mercury were decimated because the Bush Administration could decimate them, despite persuasive scientific evidence of harm; the CAA’s crystal-clear statutory mandates;
the availability of better and cleaner alternatives; and the
manifest inappropriateness of trading as a mechanism for
controlling toxics. It is this stark and unapologetic exercise
of power that makes the Administration’s mercury policies
so much more than business as usual.
Mercury Health Effects: A Little Goes a Long Way
Mercury is a heavy metal that is extraordinarily toxic and
persistent in the environment, meaning that it does not break
down into less harmful substances easily. MeHg, the form of
the metal that is most toxic to people, results from the interaction between elemental mercury and microorganisms in
soil and water.6 MeHg accumulates easily in fish, and contamination of the human food chain is the primary route of
exposure for most people.7
Because mercury is so persistent, it circulates and
recirculates from air to water to soil and back again without
losing its toxic characteristics, producing what scientists
call the “global mercury cycle,” defined as the amount of
mercury circulating in the environment of the planet at any
one time.8 Of course, mercury’s persistence also means that
it can remain embedded in sediment, soil, or water long after
it was emitted.
A very small amount of mercury goes a very long way.
Worldwide, total air emissions from natural and anthropogenic sources are estimated to total 5,500 tons per year
(TPY), although this number is far from precise.9 To put the
relative size of these numbers in perspective, compare them
to EPA estimates that in 1999, industrial sources emitted
over 97 million tons of carbon monoxide, 25 million tons
of nitrogen oxide, and 18 million tons of volatile organic
compounds.10
Obviously, there is little we can do about natural sources
of mercury air emissions. However, there is growing evidence that anthropogenic sources dominate the global cycle.
Scientists studying ice cores withdrawn from the Upper
Fremont Glacier in Wyoming estimate that over the last 100
years, anthropogenic—or man-made—sources account for
approximately 70% of the global total, or approximately
3,800 tons.11 American sources contribute a relatively small
6. 2000 NAS Report, supra note 3, at 1-5.
7. Id.
8. For a good description of this phenomenon, see U.S. EPA, Deposition of Air Pollutants to the Great Waters, Third Report
to Congress 2-4 (2000) (EPA 453-R-00-005), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/gr8water.
9. U.S. EPA, Mercury Study Report to Congress 0-1 & 2-5
(1997) (EPA 452-R-97-003) [hereinafter 1997 EPA Mercury
Report].
10. U.S. EPA, National Air Quality and Emission Trends
Report (2001) (EPA 454-R-01-004), available at http://www.epa.
gov/air/aqtrnd99/toc.html; id. at 136 (carbon monoxide), 141 (nitrogen oxides), 147 (volatile organic compounds).
11. P.F. Schuster et al., Atmospheric Mercury Deposition During the
Last 270 Years: A Glacial Ice Core Record of Natural and Anthropogenic Sources, 36 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 2303 (2002), available at
http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/paleo/pubs/schuster2002/schuster2002.
html.
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to be a reduction in the concentrations of MeHg in fish
share of this total amount—approximately 158 tons annurather than a replacement of fish in the diet by other
ally.12 EPA estimates that roughly 87% of these air emisfoods. . . . On the basis of its evaluation, the committee’s
sions are from combustion sources.13 Although most of the
consensus is that the value of EPA’s [RfD] is a scientifimercury entering U.S. waters results from the deposition of
cally justifiable level for the protection of public
air emissions that can travel thousands of miles, EPA estihealth.20

mates that approximately 60% of the total mercury deposited in the United States comes from American—as opposed
to worldwide—anthropogenic sources.14
Exposure to high levels of mercury has catastrophic effects on individuals exposed in utero and at a young age, effects including mental retardation, cerebral palsy, deafness,
and blindness; even adults suffer from less severe sensory
and motor impairments.15 More subtle neurotoxic effects
occur at significantly lower doses, including poor performance on neurobehavioral tests, particularly those that evaluate attention, fine-motor function, language, visual-spatial
abilities, e.g., drawing, and verbal memory.16 Recent studies
also indicate that MeHg exposure can compound adverse
cardiovascular conditions, an especially cruel twist since
people suffering from such diseases are urged to make
fish—as opposed to other kinds of meat—an integral part of
their diets.17
EPA has established a reference dose (RfD) for MeHg of
0.1 microgram per kilogram (µg/kg) body weight per day
for MeHg.18 A RfD is “an estimate of a daily exposure to the
human population (including sensitive subpopulations) that
is likely to be without a risk of adverse effects when experienced over a lifetime.”19 EPA’s number sparked such a vigorous challenge by industry scientists that the U.S. Congress
directed the NAS to conduct an extensive review of the
available science. To the dismay of those who engineered
the referral, the NAS panel ultimately upheld EPA:
The population at highest risk is the children of women
who consumed large amounts of fish and seafood during
pregnancy. The committee concludes that the risk to that
population is likely to be sufficient to result in an increase in the number of children who have to struggle to
keep up in school and who might require remedial
classes or special education. Because of the beneficial
effects of fish consumption, the long-term goal needs
12. 1997 EPA Mercury Report, supra note 9, at 0-1.
13. Id.
14. U.S. EPA, Regulatory Finding on Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants From Electric Utility Steam-Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg.
79825, 79827 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 EPA Regulatory Finding].
15. 2000 NAS Report, supra note 3, at 4.
16. Id.
17. On the eve of a decision by a joint committee of experts sponsored by
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations
and the World Health Organization (WHO), a group of 50 eminent
scientists from all over the world urged the Committee to substantially lower the provisional “tolerable weekly intake” of methyl mercury. The letter is the best, most recent summary of the available
medical evidence documenting the adverse health effects of MeHg
exposure. In addition to reviewing the evidence on neurological effects, it explains these potential cardiovascular problems. Letter to
Samuel W. Page, Ph.D., Acting WHO Secretary to JECFA, from
Tord Kjellstrom, Professor et al. (June 3, 2003), attach. at 12-13
(“Several studies have linked mercury exposure to cardiovascular
disease. These studies are important because consumers are advised
to eat fish to protect against heart disease.”), available at http://www.
mercurypolicy.org/new/documents/2WHOcommentsFINAL060303.
pdf [hereinafter 50 Scientists’ Letter].
18. The RfD is set in EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System’s toxicological profile for methyl mercury, CASRN 22967-92-6, available
on the Internet at http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/0073.htm.
19. 2000 NAS Report, supra note 3, at 2.

The EPA RfD is calculated to correspond to a whole
blood mercury level below 5.8 µg per liter (µg/l) (parts per
billion) or a hair level below 1.0 µg per gram (µg/g) (parts
per million).21 In February 2003, the Agency released its
long-awaited report entitled America’s Children and the Environment.22 Among other troubling findings, the report
cited the CDC statistics that approximately 8% of women of
child-bearing age in the United States had “at least 5.8 parts
per billion of mercury in their blood in 1999-2000.”23 This
information was so startling and politically volatile that the
Wall Street Journal reported shortly before the report’s release that it had been suppressed for nine months “while the
Bush [A]dministration struggles with how to handle an increasingly contentious environmental problem.”24
Four months later, a panel of experts from the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the
World Health Organization (WHO) voted to decrease the
Provisional Tolerable Weekly Intake (PTWI) of MeHg in
food from 3.3 µ/kg body weight per week to 1.6 µg/kg body
weight.25 These international experts followed the same approach to available research as their NAS colleagues three
years previously. They concluded that the full range of data
from chemical analyses, animal testing, and epidemiological studies of mothers, infants, and children justified the decision to halve the PTWI number, despite one piece of contrary evidence: an epidemiological study involving people
on the Seychelles Islands concluding that low levels of
MeHg exposure do not have harmful neurological effects.26
We discuss the merits of the Seychelles study and its use by
conservative commentators further below.
Last but not least, the 2002 National Listing of Fish and
Wildlife Advisories revealed that the number of states issuing advisories for MeHg has risen steadily from 27 in 1993
to 45 in 2002, an increase of 138%.27 Mercury advisories
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 9, 11 (emphasis added).
50 Scientists’ Letter, supra note 17, at 3.
EPA Children’s Health Report, supra note 4.
Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
John J. Fialka, Mercury Threat to Children Rising, Says an
Unreleased EPA Report, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 2003, at A1.
25. Press Release, WHO, U.N. Committee Recommends New Dietary
Intake Limits for Mercury (June 27, 2003), available at
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/notes/2003/np20/en/.
26. Gary J. Myers et al., Prenatal Methylmercury Exposure From Ocean
Fish Consumption in the Seychelles Child Development Study, Lancet, May 17, 2003, at 1686 [hereinafter 2003 Seychelles Follow-Up
Study] (“These data do not support the hypothesis that there is a
neurodevelopmental risk from prenatal MeHg exposure resulting
solely from ocean fish consumption.”). The committee explained
the evidence it considered in Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee
on Food Additives, JECFA/61/SC, Sixty-first meeting, 10-19
June 2003, Summary and Conclusions at 18, available at
http:/www.who.int/pcs/jecfa. See also 50 Scientists’ Letter, supra
note 17, which was sent to the committee on the eve of its deliberations and contained extensive discussion of the available evidence,
including three epidemiological studies discussed in detail later in
this Article.
27. U.S. EPA, Fact Sheet, Update: National Listing of Fish and
Wildlife Advisories 5 (2003) (EPA 823-F-03-003), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ost/fish/.
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now cover 12,069,319 lake acres, or close to one-third of all
American lakes, and 473,186 river miles, or close to 13% of
all American river miles.28 Because contamination of fish is
the primary route of exposure for MeHg, populations that
depend heavily on this form of nutrition, especially those
who are subsistence fishermen, e.g., Native American populations, or who eat larger quantities of large, ocean species
such as tuna and shark, are at the greatest risk.
Given this alarming body of evidence regarding the implications of exposure, how could the Bush Administration
reject regulatory opportunities that were 14 years in the
making? With a national election coming up, one obvious
tactic (which the Administration does appear to be pursuing) is to claim that it is taking effective action and hope that
the record is sufficiently technical and confused that few but
the cognoscenti of such issues will figure out the implications of what it has really done. Despite this double speak,
there can be little doubt that the Administration affirmatively decided to either ignore the public health threat or disbelieve its severity. To really understand the meaning of its
actions, then, we must examine the larger context of the conservative campaign against any government intervention in
this arena.
Conservative Counterpunch: Just Say No
The 2000 NAS Report upholding EPA’s RfD for MeHg was a
defining moment for the development of regulation to control those emissions, as acknowledged by Quin Shea, senior
director of environmental activities at the Edison Electric
Institute (EEI), in a statement issued on the heels of the NAS
findings.29 After explaining EEI’s dogged commitment to
the principles that “environmental policy should be based
on credible science,” and noting EEI’s spirited resistance to
various EPA regulatory activities, including tighter restrictions on ozone and particulate matter, Mr. Shea told his
members: “The mercury issue is different. . . . We can’t just
say no.”30
But EEI’s conservative allies at such groups as the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Cato Institute, and Frontiers of Freedom were unwilling to engage in such a strategic retreat. Here is the
Chamber of Commerce on the mercury issue:
The push to regulate mercury emissions from power
plants is an attempt by extreme environmental groups to
hinder economic growth and force jobs overseas. Recent
science shows that fish consumption, the only major
cause of mercury exposure is not harmful to Americans
and should be an integral part of a healthy diet. U.S.
power plants account for less than 1% of all mercury
emissions. These anti-job, anti-growth extremists need
to quit scaring the public with bogus information.31

28. Id.
29. Quin Shea, Electric Perspectives, Mercury Message, Sept./Oct.
2000, available at http://www.eei.org/magazine/editorial_content/
nonav_stories/2000-09-01-apm.htm.
30. Id.
31. U.S. Chamber of Commerce Radio Actuality, Mercury
Emissions (2003), available at http://www.uschamber.com/NR/
rdonlyres/ej3hij4xabxxpzdgwln7ck7hwmhxm5j6gtpeslpzavxcss
62c5cbmuao7n65tnucydewiuplrygxpguwosk5c5ew44h/mercury
kovacs120303.txt.
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Conservative arguments against MeHg controls can be
sorted into two categories. The first rests on their ubiquitous
battle cry that regulatory decisions must be based on “sound
science”: conservatives contend that there is no good scientific evidence proving that MeHg contamination of the food
chain poses a risk to public health.32 They also assert that
even if MeHg poses a risk to vulnerable populations, most of
the air emissions causing the problem come from power
plants elsewhere in the world, making controls on U.S.
sources pointless and unfair.33
The second cluster of arguments revolves around the
other transcending principle of the deregulatory crusade—application of cost-benefit analysis. Conservatives
contend that the costs of control far outweigh the monetary
value of the benefits that will be achieved by control, making mercury a poor candidate for regulation.34 If mercury is
regulated, public health will suffer in other, more important ways. For example, pregnant women and others may
eat less fish, with the result that their diets will be less
healthy.35 Or the cost of power will escalate so dramatically that the poor, and especially the elderly, will be unable to afford air conditioning and will die in record numbers from heat stroke.36
Because these arguments are typical of the most important arguments made against regulation of toxics in virtually
all other contexts, and therefore illustrate the radically different decisionmaking framework and worldview embraced
by conservatives, we consider them at some length, focusing in this installment of our two-part series on the scientific
arguments and tackling the cost-benefit arguments in the
next installment, to be published in the June 2004 issue
of ELR.
The Science on Mercury
Scientific debates over the wisdom of regulating mercury
implicate two distinct groupings of disciplines: the life sciences necessary to assess the implications of exposure for
public health and the earth sciences necessary to determine the fate and transport of mercury air emissions
through the environment. Thus, to decide whether we regulate, it is not enough to know that MeHg contamination
of fish is harmful; we must also discover where such contamination originates.
32. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Straight Talk About
MERCURY 3 (2003), available at http://www.uschamber.com/
government/issues/environment/airquality.htm [hereinafter
Straight Talk].
33. Patrick J. Michaels, Cato Institute, EPA: Shoot First, Ask Later (Mar.
19, 2003), at http://www.cato.org/dailys/03-19-03.html [hereinafter
Shoot First].
34. Id. (“In fact, except for a few, very famous outbreaks of mercury poisoning . . . there’s precious little sickness to be found on this fairly
large planet. . . . This is a classic example of regulating first and asking questions later.”).
35. Center for Science and Public Policy, White Paper: EPA
MACT Rulemaking Not Justified by Science 4 (2003), available at http://ff.org/centers/csspp/pdf/CSPP-1203-PP.pdf [hereinafter White Paper]. The Center for Science and Public Policy is a project of the Frontiers for Freedom and should not be confused with
other institutions that have similar names.
36. Shoot First, supra note 33 (“When people really need power to
save their lives, which they do when it gets hotter than blazes in
the nation’s urban cores, it may not be there or it may be prohibitively expensive.”).
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MeHg and Public Health
In the last few years, referral of regulatory controversies to
NAS peer review panels has gone from being a useful tool in
complex regulatory decisionmaking to becoming a central
tactic used to forestall or delay regulation of toxics. From
the dangers of arsenic in drinking water to economic analyses of the benefits of controlling air pollution, Congress has
seized the initiative from EPA by dropping such controversies in the NAS’ increasingly overburdened lap.37 Reflexive
NAS referrals add several years to the regulatory process for
promulgating new rules. They also have a corrosive effect
on the Agency, discrediting its scientific expertise and ensuring that it has far less persuasive power regarding the
thousands of policies that influence industrial pollution
without maturing into full-fledged rules. For better or
worse, however, this trend is likely to continue until either
Congress or the executive branch rescues health and safety
regulatory policy from this conundrum. Objectively, the
controversy over the regulation of MeHg should fuel such a
policy change because a comprehensive NAS review upholding EPA’s RfD did not diminish resistance to further action, instead returning EPA to square one as if the review had
never occurred.
Because conservative commentators have made NAS referrals a hallmark of their crusade to restore “sound science”
to regulatory decisionmaking, but on this particular, awkward occasion the NAS panel upheld EPA’s RfD for MeHg,
conservatives were faced with the Hobson’s choice of either
re-interpreting the NAS findings or attempting to refute the
conclusions of no lesser authority than their own science
court of last resort. Ever enterprising, some re-interpreted
the report, while others invented a third approach—ignoring
its existence entirely.
Re-interpreters shamelessly cherry picked the report’s
carefully worded conclusions, omitting the crucial finding
that pregnant women who consume large amounts of fish
during pregnancy will give birth to children who are at risk
for neurological problems38 and instead asserting that the
NAS found little evidence that children are affected appreciably by low-dose prenatal exposure to mercury.39 Since
the NAS upheld EPA’s RfD, a target of unmitigated ridicule
by these same conservative commentators,40 it is quite
some feat to claim support from the NAS in the same breath
as you argue that MeHg simply does not pose a threat to
public health.
Other commentators simply sidestepped the NAS panel,
singling out just one of the many pieces of evidence considered by the panel and elevating it to transcendent impor37. See, e.g., NAS Press, Arsenic in Drinking Water (1999), available at http://books.nap.edu/books/0309063337/html/index.html;
NAS Press, Estimating the Public Health Benefits of Proposed Air Pollution Regulations (2002), available at
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309086094/html/.
38. See passage of 2000 NAS Report, quoted in supra note 3 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Steven Milloy, Mercury Scare Rising, Fox News (Feb. 21,
2003) (quoting out of context the NAS conclusion that “the functional importance of the apparent effects is uncertain”), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,79140,00.html.
40. See id. (“What’s really going on is an effort by eco-activist staffers at
the EPA to force backbreaking regulations on coal-fired electric
power plants.”).
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tance.41 This tactic may be even more troubling than blatant
distortion, in part because it has been used in a far broader
variety of contexts and in part because it represents among
the worst examples of the rapidly escalating efforts to politicize science.
To understand these implications, we must first define the
far more traditional and widely accepted mode of analysis
followed by the NAS panel. It began with an exhaustive effort to assemble all available evidence regarding mercury’s
toxicity, derived from a range of scientific disciplines and
methodologies, including chemical structure analyses, fate
and transport modeling, pharmacokinetic modeling, animal
studies, and epidemiological studies.42 When the panel upheld the EPA RfD, it was therefore able to state unequivocally that it had considered the entire “body of evidence from
human and animal studies” regarding neurological effects.43
This “weight of scientific evidence” approach is defined
elsewhere in the 2000 NAS Report as all the “considerations
involved in assessing the interpretation of published scientific information—quality of methods, ability of a study to
detect adverse effects, consistency of results across studies,
and biological plausibility of cause-and-effect relationships.”44 In plain English, the NAS panel believed that both
its mandate and its professional responsibility were to consider the entire body of data that had been assembled using a
range of scientific disciplines and methodologies. Then, exercising its consensus expert judgment to determine the implications of this evidence taken as a whole, the panel concluded that the EPA RfD is “scientifically justifiable.”45
Conservatives approach the issue of MeHg’s toxicity
from a very different perspective. For the most part, they ignore all scientific evidence, especially animal studies, that
do not directly measure the effect of MeHg exposure on human beings.46 Or, in other words, if adverse health effects
are not proven in epidemiological studies, they do not exist.
Under this reasoning, the absence of epidemiological studies should foreclose action. When epidemiological studies
exist and document a problem, conservatives subject the
data to a withering analysis that undercuts its credibility,
study-by-study.47 By the time each piece of the whole body
has been weakened, there is little left to justify action to protect public health. If, on the other hand, epidemiological
studies conflict, with some showing adverse effects and others failing to find them, conservatives elevate the second
group, urging that action be foreclosed until such potentially
false negatives can be disproved.48
This is the scenario that describes the conservative analysis of the risks posed by MeHg exposure: a single epidemiological study on the Seychelles Islands did not find a link between the consumption of contaminated fish and neurologi41. Press Release, Frontiers of Freedom, No Detectable Risk From
Mercury in Seafood, Study Shows (May 19, 2003), available at
http://www.ff.org/centers/csspp/press/051903-mercury.html
[hereinafter No Risk] (proclaiming Seychelles study definitive
proof that mercury in fish is not a problem and neglecting to mention the NAS report).
42. 2000 NAS Report, supra note 3, at 4-5.
43. Id. (emphasis added)
44. Id. at 344.
45. Id. at 11.
46. See, e.g., No Risk, supra note 41.
47. See, e.g., Straight Talk, supra note 32.
48. Id.
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cal damage in children.49 Ergo, there is no good reason to
control mercury emissions from U.S. power plants.50
Prof. Thomas McGarity has dubbed this tactic the “corpuscular approach” to regulatory science.51 Such attacks are
exhausting to follow, much less fend off. The favored vehicle used by industry practitioners of this tactic is the Information Quality Act, although the Act has not yet been used
in the mercury context.52 An obscure appropriations rider
that allows aggrieved parties to file challenges to scientific
information “disseminated” by the government, the Act neither requires the government to provide those who performed the study an opportunity to defend it nor funds that
additional burden on their professional time. The inevitable
result is that expert panels could end up with unrefuted challenges to so many essential pieces of a scientific puzzle that
they are foreclosed from applying their own judgment to the
cumulative implications of the whole.
Of course, to be consistent, conservatives would be compelled to acknowledge that the corpuscular approach is a
double-edged sword. Or, in other words, if it is a sound
methodology, it should apply to the converse situation, as
presented by the mercury debate: unless an epidemiological
study can withstand the most detailed inspection, it cannot
be used to justify inaction. After all, consider the likely reaction of deregulatory advocates if this particular shoe was on
the other foot and “environmental extremists” tried to regulate on the basis of a single epidemiological study showing
adverse effects when two other studies and the cumulative
weight of other scientific evidence exonerated the chemical.
Consistency, however, in this as in so many other contexts,
appears to be the hobgoblin of a little mind.
Although the NAS panel clearly rejected the elevation of
epidemiological data over any other form of scientific evidence, as well as the corpuscular approach to evaluating
such research, the panel had the foresight to anticipate and
respond directly to the conservative backlash to its conclusions. Consequently, even if policymakers are inclined to
take the radical approach of depriving scientists of the ability to weigh all evidence—an extraordinarily controversial
proposition in and of itself—they must also reject the NAS
interpretation of relevant human data. That data and the
competing analyses can be summarized as follows.
Two instances of severe and accidental mercury poisoning in Japan and Iraq provide the first pieces of evidence regarding the catastrophic results of high dose human exposure.53 While data derived from these incidents provide
some indication of what happens to people at far lower
doses, the completion of three major epidemiological studies of populations exposed primarily through fish consumption are considered far more relevant to the regulatory issues
at stake here and abroad. Two of those epidemiological studies—one conducted in New Zealand and the second conducted on the Faroe Islands—found significant neurologi49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Thomas O. McGarity, Proposal for Linking Culpability and Causation to Ensure Corporate Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 Wm. &
Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 19 (2001).
52. Treasury and General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001,
Pub. L. No. 106, §515 (2001). For a list of Information Quality Act
challenges filed thus far, see http://www.ombwatch.org/article/archive/
171/.
53. 2000 NAS Report, supra note 3, at 4.
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cal effects at low doses.54 As mentioned earlier, a third, carried out by a team headed by Dr. Gary Myers at the University of Rochester, found that with similar exposures, Seychelles Islanders experienced no discernible effects.55
Although it concluded that all three studies were “welldesigned and carefully conducted,” the NAS panel ultimately concluded that the Faroe Islands study was “the most
appropriate” for deriving an RfD, in part because it was verified by the New Zealand study and in part because the Seychelles study contradicted the remaining body of evidence
documenting MeHg’s hazards.56
Despite the NAS analysis of the relative merits of the
three epidemiological studies, conservatives argue that the
Seychelles study, standing alone, is definitive evidence that
MeHg in fish is not a public health threat.57 This claim was
fueled by the publication of an article in 2003 reporting that
the team of scientists had returned to the Seychelles to conduct follow-up work with the same group of children covered by their earlier work, who were then nine years old.58
Once again, they found “no detectable adverse effects in a
population consuming large quantities of a wide variety of
ocean fish.”59 The authors of the 2003 report, published in
the prominent British medical journal the Lancet, were
careful to note that a variety of explanations could account
for the differences in results between their work and the
conclusions reached by the other two studies.60 But champions of their work, and the one of the authors’ own public
statements about it, soon rode roughshod over these
learned qualifications.
Here is Dr. Myers, lead author on the Seychelles study,
touting the significance of his work in testimony before the
U.S. Senate Environment and Public Works Committee:
“We do not believe that there is presently good scientific evidence that moderate fish consumption is harmful to the fetus.”61 In this simplistic sound bite, Dr. Myers did not limit
himself to the results of the Seychelles study; nor did he ac54. Id. at 4-10, 250-70 (discussing the three reports).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 5-6:
Differences in the study designs and in the characteristics of
the study populations might explain the differences in findings between the Faroe and the Seychelles studies. . . . When
taking the New Zealand Study into account, however, those
differences in study characteristics do not appear to explain the differences in the findings [because] the New
Zealand study used a research design and entailed a pattern
of exposure similar to the Seychelles study but it reported
associations with Hg that were similar to those found in the
Faroe Islands.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See, e.g., Straight Talk, supra note 32.
2003 Seychelles Follow-Up Study, supra note 26.
Id. at 1692.
For example, the authors acknowledged that the fact that they used
maternal hair samples to detect levels of exposure, rather than the
more sensitive umbilical cord blood samples used in the Faroe Islands study, could have produced different results, and they also acknowledged that they had used a different battery of tests for evaluating neurological effects. Id. at 1691. Both of these discrepancies
were also observed by the NAS panel, and of course did not change
between the earlier and later iterations of the Seychelles study. 2000
NAS Report, supra note 3, at 5-7.
61. Hearing on Climate History and Mercury Emissions Before the U.S.
Senate Comm. on Env’t and Public Works (July 29, 2003) (statement
of Dr. Gary Myers, Professor of Neurology and Pediatrics, Department of Neurology, University of Rochester Medical Center) (emphasis added).
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knowledge the existence of contrary scientific evidence.
Rather, he spoke as if he had searched high and low throughout the world and had never found any “good” evidence that
MeHg is a human health problem.
Not surprisingly, on the basis of this statement, Dr. Myers
became the hero and centerpiece of Reality Check: Straight
Talk About MERCURY, published by the Chamber of Commerce, which concludes that “contemplated legislative and
regulatory actions are premature and ill-advised.”62 In an effort to boost Dr. Myers’ credibility, the Chamber of Commerce notes in the same executive summary that reaches
this conclusion that Dr. Myers’ work was funded by the U.S.
National Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.63 It neglects to mention that Dr. Myers and his team
also received $486,000 in funding from the Electric Power
Research Institute, as well as $10,000 from the National
Tuna Foundation, and $5,000 from the National Fisheries
Institute.64 This disclosure was similarly omitted from the
2003 article in Lancet that fueled the new round of controversy over MeHg controls, despite a 2001 policy adopted by
prominent medical journals including Lancet requiring the
disclosure of funding sources of this importance.65
In highlighting the failure of conservative groups and the
Lancet to disclose the industry origins of some of Dr. Myers’
funding, our point is not that such funding in and of itself undercuts the credibility of the science. Rather, the effort to
hide this particular ball is hypocritical and duplicitous given
the Chamber of Commerce’s misleading effort to enhance
the credibility of Dr. Myers’ work by boasting that it was
funded by the government.
Far more important, however, are the high stakes implicated by the general effort to undermine the weight of scientific evidence approach to decisionmaking. As conservatives escalate efforts to use Information Quality Act challenges to knock out individual pieces of science, the likelihood emerges that science will become a factor as heavily
politicized as any other, with the power of money, as opposed to its intrinsic merits, determining how research is
used. This element of the perfect storm will have been
turned inland, heading straight for the places where people live.
A Global Problem?
However complex the science underlying MeHg’s implications for public health, it is at least equaled by intense debate
over the fate and transport of mercury through the environment. Millions of dollars have been spent on studies of the
various facets of this puzzle: how much and what species of
mercury are emitted by global sources, either natural or
62. Straight Talk, supra note 32.
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anthropogenic; what is the breakdown between global, national, regional, and local sources; how far and how fast do
air emissions travel before they are deposited on the land;
how does air deposition become methylated, entering the
food chain and threatening public health; which specific
categories of sources contribute the species of mercury most
likely to become methylated; and—given the uncertainty
that plagues the monitoring and modeling necessary to answer these questions—will regulation do any good?66 After
all, if the MeHg in the large-mouth bass a subsistence fisherman catches for his family’s dinner is primarily contaminated by sources thousands of miles and dozens of political
jurisdictions away, a local regulatory strategy may not solve
the problem. Conversely, if local deposition is a substantial
source of the contamination, and it is not feasible to persuade foreign sources to reduce their air emissions any time
soon, our choices would appear to boil down to stringent local controls or eliminating affected fish from our diet.
EPA has responded to growing evidence that local controls do help by promulgating major rules controlling mercury air emissions from hospital and municipal waste incinerators.67 The electric utility rule was to be its next, long-delayed effort to address a primary source of domestic, anthropogenic deposition.
As noted earlier, the 2000 NAS decision to uphold EPA’s
RfD brought electric utilities to the rulemaking table to a
greater degree than ever before. Gradually, however, it began to dawn on utility executives that the Bush Administration’s support for their industry, manifested in a variety of
other formats, presented a new opportunity to rejoin the
sound science debate that their conservative allies had never
really abandoned. Adopting the same corpuscular tactics
that seemed to serve them so well in the public health context, conservative commentators and industry scientists
have mounted an unrelenting challenge to EPA and state efforts to document U.S. power plants’ contribution to the
mercury problem.
There is no dispute that American power plants are far
cleaner than sources abroad. As mentioned earlier, in 1996,
EPA reported to Congress that total global mercury air emissions are about 5,000 to 5,500 TPY, with the United States
contributing only 158 tons, or about 3% of that amount.68
This discrepancy infuriates conservative commentators:
The United States, with about 25[%] of the world’s total
economic activity, should logically emit about 1,000 of
these megagrams. But we only throw out, according to
the EPA, 144 megagrams, or 3.6[%] of the world’s total.
That’s a pretty good bang for your mercury buck. . . .
All of this means that there are plenty of densely populated places on earth . . . that are exposed to one heck of
a lot more mercury from power production and other
economic activity. Where are the bodies? Where are the
sick millions? We Americans pay our environmental

63. Id.
64. Joint Institute for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition
(JIFSAN), Annual Report 1998-1999, available at http://web.
archive.org/web/20020616124945/http://jifsan/umd.edu/Rev99
AnRep.htm (“JIFSAN played a crucial role in bringing together the
resources to continue [the Seychelles Child Development Study] on
the developmental effects of mercury. Funding for the project was
provided by the FDA . . . , the Electric Power Research Institute
(present funding $486,000), the National Tuna Foundation
($10,000), and the National Fisheries Institute ($5,000).”).
65. Editorial: Sponsorship, Authorship, and Accountability, 345 New
Eng. J. Med. 825 (2001).

66. The best sources that give a flavor of these complexities are the 1997
EPA Mercury Report, supra note 9, and Florida Dep’t of
Envtl. Protection (FDEP), Integrating Atmospheric Mercury Deposition With Aquatic Cycling in South Florida
(2002, rev. 2003), available at http://www.floridadep.org/labs/
mercury/docs/flmercury.htm [hereinafter 2003 Florida Mercury Study].
67. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pt. 60, subpts. Ce, Ec (hospital waste incinerators); id. subpts. Cb, Eb (large municipal waste combusters).
68. 1997 EPA Mercury Report, supra note 9, at 0-1.
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lobby billions of dollars per year to find them. They
A study conducted by the Florida Department of Environaren’t there.69
mental Protection (FDEP) provides significant support for

At one level, this argument is grounded in a form of economic rough justice: so long as the United States is relatively clean and mercury levels here are declining, we are
justified in refusing to take action to curb pollution until
dirtier countries go first. Of course, as discussed above, conservatives do not concede that mercury poses a public health
risk, making this kind of syllogism easier to advocate. Even
so, we find ourselves revisited by the consistency hobgoblin. If we are justified in failing to take action because we
contribute only a small portion of total global air emissions,
then should we be compelled to take action when we contribute the lion’s share of emissions, as we do in the global
climate change arena?
Whatever the logical implications of the “stay dirty until
others clean up” argument, it has technical aspects that must
also be considered. The argument assumes that since MeHg
in American fish largely derives from the global mercury
cycle, it is pointless to impose large costs on the owners of
any American facilities until their international counterparts
go first.70 However, this rationale is directly refuted by
EPA’s finding, undisputed by mainstream industry scientists, that “roughly 60[%] of the total mercury deposited in
the [United States] comes from U.S. anthropogenic air
emission sources; the percentage is estimated to be even
higher in certain regions (e.g., [Northeast United States]).”71
One final point of global equity deserves mention: EPA
models indicate that each year American sources contribute
more to the global mercury cycle—107 tons—than the
country gets back in deposition from the global cycle—35
tons.72 We may be relatively clean, but we are nevertheless
exporting the pollution we generate at higher levels than
other countries are sending their pollution to us.
Undeterred by these inconvenient statistics, conservative
commentators and industry scientists delve deeper into the
details of domestic deposition. They do not dispute that coalfired electric utility boilers are among the largest, unregulated
sources of mercury in the country, contributing 30% of domestic anthropogenic air emissions.73 However, they argue,
EPA has not yet demonstrated that the precise species of
mercury produced by coal-fired power plants is in fact the
same mercury that, when methylated, contaminates fish.74
In its 2000 Regulatory Finding, EPA dismissed this “waste
fingerprinting” argument, concluding that it “is not necessary to quantify the amount of mercury in fish due to electric
utility steam-generating unit emissions relative to other
sources” in order to begin a rulemaking on the subject.75
69. Shoot First, supra note 33.
70. White Paper, supra note 35, at 4.
71. 2000 EPA Regulatory Finding, supra note 14, at 79827 (emphasis
added). In a relatively careful piece of technical writing that cited experts working for the industry-sponsored Electric Power Research
Institute, Carola Hanisch explained the scientific uncertainties of
mercury deposition without challenging these figures. Carola
Hanisch, Where Is Mercury Deposition Coming From?, Envtl.
Sci. & Tech., Apr. 1, 1998, available at http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/
est/98/apr/mer.html [hereinafter Mercury Deposition].
72. 1997 EPA Mercury Report, supra note 9, at 0-1 to 0-2.
73. 2000 EPA Regulatory Finding, supra note 14, at 79827.
74. Mercury Deposition, supra note 71 (“Only Hg2+ readily deposits locally. The fraction of Hg2+ that occurs in mercury emitted from
sources such as coal fired power plants is not well established.”).
75. 2000 EPA Regulatory Finding, supra note 14, at 79827.

that determination.76 On November 6, 2003, then-FDEP
Secretary David Struhs, a political appointee of President
George W. Bush’s brother, Gov. Jeb Bush (R-Fla.), announced that “[p]ollution controls introduced two decades
ago to limit mercury air emissions are delivering dramatic
results in our lifetime—similar to the environmental gains
made with the elimination of lead in gasoline.”77
The motivation for the Florida study was the need to calculate a total maximum daily load (TMDL) under the Clean
Water Act for mercury contamination in two million acres
of the South Florida Everglades, an imperative confronting
states throughout the country as TMDL deadlines come
due.78 Florida had already imposed stringent controls on
municipal and medical waste incinerators, producing significant declines in local mercury air deposition sources.79 The
question confronting regulators was what other measures
would be necessary to combat levels of contamination that
had led to fish advisories throughout the area.
Since air deposition plays such a significant role in mercury contamination of water bodies throughout the country,
EPA funded the Florida pilot project to integrate models of
atmospheric mercury deposition and aquatic cycling so that
the TMDL could take into account all of the most significant
sources. The modeling was carefully calibrated to extensive
air and water quality monitoring, as well as monitoring of
MeHg bioaccumulation in large-mouth bass. The scientists
participating in the study were careful to point out that “mercury issues within the Everglades are extremely difficult to
assess due to the size and heterogeneity of the Everglades.”80 They added that, even if all atmospheric deposition was eliminated, fish would still be contaminated by a
“small residual mercury concentration” that results from
“legacy mercury, deposited historically and now lying deep
within the sediments.”81 Nevertheless, the monitoring and
modeling results provided by the study provide extensive
evidence that the mercury concentrations in large-mouth
bass (and, for good measure, great egret feathers) have declined 75% from the mid-1990s to the year 2002.82 The
model “predicts a linear relationship between atmospheric
mercury deposition and mercury concentration in largemouth bass,” the study concludes.83 These results were sufficiently convincing that the Florida Electric Power Coordinating Group was compelled to acknowledge that the fundamental hypothesis of the study, i.e., changes in local mercury emissions are the reason for lower levels of mercury in
fish, “cannot be rejected.”84
The Florida utilities’ reaction did not convince industry
scientists at the national level to accept regulation, however.
A statement issued by the Electric Power Research Institute
76. 2003 Florida Mercury Study, supra note 66.
77. Press Release, FDEP, Florida Everglades Study Reveals Decline in
Mercury Levels, Nov. 6, 2003, available at http://www.dep/state.
fl.us/secretary/comm/2003/nov/1106.htm [hereinafter Struhs
Press Release].
78. This requirement is contained in 42 U.S.C. §1313(d).
79. Struhs Press Release, supra note 77.
80. 2003 Florida Mercury Study, supra note 66, at 5.
81. Id. at 67-68, 40-41.
82. Id. at 56.
83. Id. at 67.
84. Id. at 57.
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(EPRI) argued: (1) mercury emissions released by municipal and medical waste incinerators are different from those
released by power plants; (2) the Florida Everglades is a
“unique” ecological system and results there cannot be extrapolated to other waterways; (3) despite extensive calibration of the models, the Florida report does not consider
extensively enough the contribution of global sources; and
(4) ergo, regulating power plants would not help reduce levels of contamination in fish.85
There are two grains of truth lurking in this counterattack,
which will undoubtedly evolve into an epic battle of the experts in court no matter what EPA’s final decision on mercury from power plants. The first is that, according to EPA
estimates, incinerators contain about 20% more of the reactive mercury that is most easily methylated than do coalfired power plants.86 Further, as the Florida scientists acknowledge, the Everglades, like every web of natural systems, have their own unique characteristics.87 But the point
made by the utility industry and its conservative allies is not
that some uncertainties exist in this, as in any complex scientific analysis. Rather, they are demanding that regulators
meet such an extraordinarily high burden of proof that we
are unlikely to assemble science that meets their stringent
threshold for decades—long after most edible fish are contaminated to the point that it will take decades’ more effort
to reverse these effects. Hidden beneath all the scientific
complexification are decisions that most policymakers,
much less the American people, have no idea is being made.
We turn next to the law on air pollution, as a prelude to discussing and critiquing the Administration’s mercury policies from a legal perspective.
The Law on Mercury
In addressing mercury emissions from electric utility
steam-generating units88 and mercury cell chlor-alkali
plants, EPA faced a legally straightforward task. Section
112 of the CAA lists mercury as a hazardous air pollutant
subject to regulation,89 and EPA had previously concluded
that both power plants and chlor-alkali plants should be regulated as sources of mercury emissions.90 Under the clear
language of §112, listing of mercury and of these categories
of sources led to an obligation on the part of EPA to regulate
mercury emissions by prescribing the maximum achievable
control technology (MACT) and requiring its installation.
None of these steps is controversial under the settled understanding of §112, and each is a familiar part of EPA’s dayto-day regulatory work.
But in the ninth inning, after years of wringing its hands
about the appropriate MACT, things went terribly wrong.
With respect to power plants, sometime in the months before
the Agency was set to issue its proposal to regulate mercury,
85. EPRI, The Florida Mercury Report—Putting It in Perspective (undated), available at http://www.epri.com/corporate/discover_epri/
news/HotTopics/env_FloridaMercuryRpt.pdf.
86. 2003 Florida Mercury Study, supra note 66, at 24, tbl. 6.
87. Id. at 5.
88. Referred to throughout as “power plants” for ease of exposition.
89. 42 U.S.C. §112(b)(1).
90. 2000 EPA Regulatory Finding, supra note 14; for chlor-alkali plants,
see Initial List of Categories of Sources Under Section 112(c)(1) of
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 57 Fed. Reg. 31576 (July
16, 1992).
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Jeffrey Holmstead, the head of EPA’s air office, got the idea
that it would be better to reduce mercury by allowing
industrywide emissions trading instead of plant-specific
pollutions controls. This about-face was such a drastic departure from the course the Agency had been on since 1990
that EPA officials did not have the courage to take it to its
logical extreme and announce trading as the only approach
EPA would pursue. Instead, the Agency’s Federal Register
notice soliciting comments on Holmstead’s ideas preserved
the possibility that EPA might still pursue MACT controls.
As a result, EPA’s preamble reads like an early white paper
on the various policy alternatives to reduce mercury emissions from power plants, not like the formal agency proposal it purports to be. The Agency ties itself in knots trying
to explain how the law allows it to promulgate either of
these diametrically opposed options. Indeed, EPA acknowledges that it has not even offered a proposal for the design of
the cap-and-trade program it favors, promising that its ideas
will be forthcoming in not just one, but two, future supplemental notices.91
At this rate, regulation of mercury emissions from power
plants is going nowhere fast, and EPA is obviously in no
special hurry to move things along. So deep are the legal
flaws in EPA’s alternatives that there is virtually no hope
that its final rule will survive judicial review. One thing is
guaranteed, however: it will take years before these issues
are resolved and, in the meantime, mercury emissions from
power plants will remain uncontrolled or inadequately controlled. Unlike the Administration’s ill-advised “reforms”
of the new source review program, which displaced an existing regulatory structure in favor of legally wobbly deregulation so that when it was stayed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit92 the regulatory program came back into force, the mercury proposals
do not displace any program and even early action by a court
of appeals will not bring regulation of mercury into being.
One need not be a hopeless cynic to wonder whether this
Administration, foe of environmental regulation and friend
of the energy industry, thinks this legal uncertainty, with its
attendant delay, is just fine.
For mercury cell chlor-alkali plants, the problems took a
different form. In that instance, EPA did not root around outside §112 for legal authority to avoid strict regulation. Instead, it simply undermined §112 itself, by so narrowly classifying the categories subject to regulation that the Agency
could, in effect, grandfather the most antiquated chlor-alkali
plants in the country.
We start with a primer on §112, and then turn to separate
analyses of the power plant and chlor-alkali proposals.
Mercury and MACT
In the 1990 CAA Amendments, Congress revamped the
§112 program for hazardous air pollutants in two large
ways. First, rather than wait any longer for EPA to list hazardous pollutants as a precondition to regulating them (it
had taken EPA 20 years to list just eight pollutants),93 Congress itself took the bull by the horns and listed some 188
91. 69 Fed. Reg. at 4703 (describing planned supplemental notices for
model trading program for states and for determining unit allocations for existing sources under program).
92. New York v. EPA, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26520 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
93. Sierra Club v. EPA, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 348 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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pollutants to be regulated by the Agency.94 Second, Congress moved from the former health-based framework of
§112 to a performance-based framework. No longer did
Congress instruct EPA to set §112 limits based on what
would protect public health with an ample margin of safety.
Instead, Congress instructed EPA to set these limits based
on the absolutely best available technological methods for
controlling the hazardous air pollutants at issue.95
Even after these amendments, however, EPA still had
some listing to do. Before regulating a particular source under §112, EPA was required to list categories or subcategories of the sources of the air pollutants on the §112 list.96
Once EPA had listed a category or subcategory, it could delete the category from its §112 list only if the Agency made a
health-based determination that the category no longer belonged on the list.97
Upon listing a category or subcategory of sources under
§112, EPA became obligated to prescribe MACT under the
stringent provisions of §112(d)98:
Emissions standards . . . shall require the maximum degree of reduction in emissions of the hazardous air pollutants . . . (including a prohibition on such emissions,
where achievable) that the Administrator, taking into
consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduction, and any non-air quality health and environmental
impacts and energy requirements, determines is achievable for new or existing sources in [that] category or subcategory . . . .99

Not only does the language “maximum degree of reduction
in emissions” signal congressional intent that the standards
be strict (most similar provisions settle for simply the “best”
control measures), it also specified exactly how good the
control measures must be. Section 112(d)(3) requires new
sources to achieve at least the emissions control achieved by
the “best controlled similar source.”100 Existing sources are
required to achieve the emissions control achieved by the
best performing 12% of existing sources (or the best performing 5 sources if the category has fewer than 30
sources).101 Section 112(d)(2) further provides a virtual
smorgasbord of emission control measures that might be regarded as MACT, ranging from the total elimination of a
hazardous air pollutant to requirements for operator training
or certification. As for deadlines, the standards were to be
met within three years of the standards’ promulgation102 unless a one-year extension were granted by EPA.103 With their
high aspirations and tight deadlines, the MACT standards
94.
95.
96.
97.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

42 U.S.C. §7412(b) (listing pollutants).
Id. §7412(d).
Id. §7412(c)(1).
For sources emitting carcinogens, EPA had to find that no source in
the relevant category posed a greater than one in one million risk to
the most exposed individual in the relevant population, and for
non-carcinogens, EPA had to find that no source emitted the hazardous pollutants in quantities that would be inadequate to protect public health with an ample margin of safety nor cause an adverse environmental effect. Id. §7412(c)(9)(B).
Id. §7412(c)(2).
Id. §7412(d)(2).
Id. §7412(d)(3).
Id. §7412(d)(3(B).
Id. §7412(i)(3)(A).
Id. §7412(i)(3)(B).
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under §112 are among the most stringent of the regulatory
programs contemplated by the CAA.
Congress listed mercury as one of the hazardous air pollutants in 1990. However, it added a special twist for power
plants in general, and for mercury from power plants in particular, instructing EPA to do a report on the health hazards
posed by emissions of hazardous air pollutants from power
plants and the alternative control strategies available to control them. On the basis of those findings, EPA was told to
regulate these emissions if “appropriate and necessary.”
EPA prepared the required report in 1998, concluding that
mercury was the most worrisome of the hazardous air pollutants emitted by power plants.104 In December 2000, the
Agency announced that regulation of mercury from power
plants was “appropriate and necessary” within the meaning
of §112(n)(1)(A).105 In a settlement agreement with the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC), the Agency
promised a §112 standard for mercury from power plants by
December 2003.106
Power Play
Until EPA’s formal proposal to regulate mercury under §111
of the CAA was made public, everyone had assumed that
mercury from utility units would be regulated under §112.
And with good reason. Not only had EPA reported to Congress, in 1997 and 1998, that mercury from power plants
posed a serious health hazard warranting regulation under
§112,107 and not only had the Agency found, in December
2000, that regulation of utility units was necessary and appropriate under §112,108 but the Agency had settled a lawsuit
with the NRDC by agreeing to issue a proposal to regulate
mercury under §112 by December 2003.109 What is more,
the meetings of a working group of experts, formed to advise EPA on the appropriate standard, proceeded under the
assumption that regulation would take the form of a MACT
standard under §112.110
What few people outside the government knew at the
time was that, in the months leading to the December 2003
proposal, Holmstead was quietly working to develop a plan
to go forward with regulation under §111 instead of §112,
and to base regulation on an emissions trading program
rather than on the more restrictive approach of §112.111
104. 1997 EPA Mercury Report, supra note 9.
105. 2000 EPA Regulatory Finding, supra note 14.
106. The agreement settled the case of Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, No. 92-1415 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 17, 1998).
107. 2000 EPA Regulatory Finding, supra note 14; U.S. EPA, Study of
Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions From Electric Utility
Steam-Generating Units—Final Report to Congress (1998)
(EPA 453-R-98-004a) [hereinafter 1998 EPA Hazardous Air
Pollutant Study].
108. 2000 EPA Regulatory Finding, supra note 14.
109. See supra note 106.
110. Indeed, the charge to the working group from EPA made clear that
advising EPA as to an appropriate §112 MACT standard was the
group’s sole task, and indeed that “revisiting the rationale for, and
background of, the finding [that regulation was appropriate and necessary under §112] is not a topic of discussion for the working
group.” U.S. EPA, Electric Utility Steam-Generating Units
MACT Rulemaking Working Group, Charge and Process
(2001). This document, and others related to the working group, are
available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/combust/utiltox/utoxpg.
html#CAAAC.
111. Eric Pianin, EPA Led Mercury Policy Shift, Wash. Post, Dec. 20,
2003.
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The public health implications of EPA’s turnabout are significant. Section 112-based proposals floated by EPA several years ago (before the “Clear Skies Initiative” became
the Administration’s catch-all solution to air pollution) projected that implementation of a MACT standard for mercury
would reduce mercury emissions from power plants from
approximately 48 TPY to as little as 5 TPY in 2008.112 Compare this to EPA’s trading proposal to limit mercury to 34
TPY in 2010, and 15 TPY in 2018.
EPA’s proposal is, to put it most charitably, inchoate. Indeed, it is more accurate to refer to EPA’s proposal in the plural rather than the singular. EPA has not decided which approach—trading or MACT—it should adopt, although its
clear preference is for trading. It also has not decided which
provision of the CAA—§111 or §112—it should use in developing a trading program, although its clear preference is
for §111. (A trading program under §111 would be run by
the states as a state implementation plan (SIP)-like program,
while a trading program under §112 would be run by EPA.)
It has not decided whether to undo its December 2000 finding that regulation of mercury is appropriate and necessary
under §112 of the Act, although it is obviously sorely
tempted to do so. It has not decided which specific part of
§112—subsection (d) or subsection (n)—would justify the
creation of an emissions trading program. It has not decided
what the contours of the trading program will be, leaving
even such threshold questions as whether the Agency or the
states will run the program to another day, to be dealt with in
a supplemental notice. Charged in 1990 with studying the
need to regulate mercury from power plants, EPA, over 13
years later, has little to show for its time and efforts other
than an ill-conceived last-minute reversal of an emerging
position that had occupied the Agency for many years.
EPA’s proposals for regulating mercury from power
plants suffer from numerous legal flaws. Indeed, the sheer
numerousness of EPA’s suggestions seems to us to belie a
deep insecurity on the Agency’s part about the legality of its
actions. In several places, the Agency simply throws out a
statutory section that might—just might!—provide a legal
basis for its proposals, and asks for public comment on
whether the section flies as a statutory grounding for the
Agency’s ideas. Especially in a post-Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council world, in which judicial
deference to agencies’ statutory interpretation is premised
in part on agencies’ expertise regarding the statutes they administer, this hunt-and-peck method of statutory interpretation is highly dubious.113
In any event, even EPA’s full-scale statutory discussions
fall flat. We do not attempt here to discuss all of the problems with EPA’s analysis, nor do we venture beyond the
problems EPA’s analysis poses for its proposals with respect
to mercury from power plants.114 In addition, although there
are good reasons to suspect that EPA’s proposed MACT
standard for mercury is much too lenient, we will not en112. Testimony of David Hawkins, Hearings on S. 485, Clear Skies Act of
2003, U.S. Senate Committee on Env’t and Public Works, Subcommittee on Clean Air, Climate Change, and Nuclear Safety (Apr. 8,
2003).
113. 467 U.S. 837, 14 ELR 20507 (1984).
114. We do not, for example, take on EPA’s proposals with respect to
emissions of nickel from power plants, nor do we analyze EPA’s argument that it need not regulate other hazardous air pollutants from
power plants, beyond mercury and nickel, even once it has listed
power plants as a source category under §112.
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deavor here to address the technically complex question of
what MACT for mercury should be.115
Still, we find we have plenty to say.
Because we are convinced that Holmstead, with the full
backing of his Administration superiors, intends to pursue
trading in the final analysis, our discussion centers on EPA’s
attempt to evade §112’s MACT requirements and to embrace instead a trading program under either §111 or §112.
Here are the fundamental problems with this part of EPA’s
proposal, from a legal perspective:
· EPA has not justified deleting power plants from
§112’s list of regulated sources.
· Because EPA has not done so, it must regulate
mercury from power plants under §112 of the Act.
· Neither §112(d) nor §112(n) authorizes EPA to
create a trading program in toxic pollutants.
· Even if a court could be persuaded to allow EPA
to sidestep §112, the Agency is not authorized to
employ trading under §111.
Delisting
First of all, EPA has not made the findings required by
§112(c)(9) of the Act as a predicate for delisting. EPA found
in December 2000 that mercury from power plants should
be regulated under §112 of the Act, and listed this category
of sources under this section.116 Section 112(c)(9) allows
EPA to delete a category from §112’s list only if it finds:
(1) in the case of carcinogens, that emissions from any one
source from the category will not pose a risk of greater than
one in one million or more to the most exposed individual in
the relevant population; or (2) in the case of other hazardous
air pollutants, that the emissions level from any one source
will be low enough adequately to protect the public health
with an ample margin of safety and to avoid an adverse environmental effect.117 EPA has made neither of these findings
in its proposal to regulate mercury, and has offered no evidence that would allow it to make these findings. EPA may
not delete power plants from §112’s list without making the
required factual, health-based findings.
Instead of satisfying these statutory predicates, EPA concludes that delisting is appropriate because the Agency has
suddenly discovered—decades after the provision’s initial
enactment—that §111 provides the authority to regulate
mercury emissions from power plants. EPA nods in the direction of §112(c)(9)’s requirements, but argues that they
apply only where the original listing of a source category
115. Potentially problematic aspects of EPA’s MACT proposal include
the agency’s decision to slice up the coal-fired power industry into
tiny little segments depending on the precise type of coal used, see 69
Fed. Reg. at 4666, and its adjustment, based on “variability,” to the
average emissions rate of the best-performing sources in each category, which led to an emissions rate for bituminous coal plants that is
17 times the average achieved by the best performers, and a rate for
sub-bituminous coal plants that is 8 times the average achieved by
the best performers in that category. M.J. Bradley et al., Standards
for Power Plant Mercury and Nickel Emissions: Delay Is the Only
Certainty, Envtl. Energy Insights, Nov./Dec. 2003, at 3. In addition, EPA’s quite dismissive handling of precombustion techniques
that would reduce mercury emissions, 69 Fed. Reg. at 4668-69, and
of the possibility of requiring reductions beyond MACT, id. at
4675-77, may not withstand the arbitrary and capricious standard
of review.
116. 2000 EPA Regulatory Finding, supra note 14.
117. 42 U.S.C. §7412(c)(9).
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was consistent with the “statutory listing criteria,” and that
“[t]he failure to fully recognize the scope of existing statutory authority in December 2000, is analogous to those situations where EPA has listed a source category under
[§]112(c)(1) and later determined that it lacked a factual
predicate for such listing and, therefore, delisted the source
category without following the criteria of [§]112(c)(9).”118
But an incorrect factual predicate for a listing decision
is an altogether different matter from EPA’s conclusion in
this instance.
There are two large problems with evading §112(c)(9)’s
requirements based on this kind of analysis. First, if EPA is
correct that §111 gives it the authority to regulate mercury
from power plants quite apart from the requirements of
§112, then EPA would have had the authority, even after the
1990 Amendments to the Act, to go ahead and regulate mercury from power plants before conducting the study and
writing the reports required by §112(n). Under that interpretation, EPA need not have bothered with the 1998 report and
the 2000 finding; it could have simply regulated under §111
in the first instance. Yet no one, to our knowledge, has made
this argument—least of all EPA—in debating the specifics
of regulating mercury from power plants.
A second problem with EPA’s attempt to avoid the requirements of §112(c)(9) is that the Agency’s change of
heart with respect to listing power plants under §112 has
nothing to do with facts. It is therefore not analogous to the
mistaken factual predicates at issue in previous delisting decisions. Throughout its preamble, EPA assiduously avoids
any specific examination of the health benefits offered by
regulation under §112 as compared to §111—even though
the Agency frequently concedes that it must show that regulation under §111 adequately addresses the emissions of
mercury from power plants. What we have here is a political
change of heart, not a factual error, and §112(c)(9) makes
clear that a political change of heart does not justify taking a
source category off the §112 list.
Not only has EPA failed to make the health-based findings required by §112(c)(9) for delisting a source category,
it has also failed to satisfy its own standard for substituting
regulation under §111 for regulation under §112. In numerous places in its discussion of its decision to choose §111
over §112, EPA concedes that it must show that health effects from mercury will be adequately addressed by §111.119
Emphasizing this point, the draft preamble EPA sent to the
White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) in November 2003 specifically left room for a
whole section to be written, explaining how the §111 standard could meet EPA’s self-stated requirement when the
deadline of §112 was stricter than that of §111.120 Notably,
118. 69 Fed. Reg. at 4689.
119. Id. at 4684, 4687, 4689.
120. Draft—Deliberative Document, Proposed Revision of Regulatory
Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants From Electric
Utility [Steam]-Generating Units and Proposed Standards of Performance for Mercury and Nickel From New Stationary Sources and
Emission Guidelines for Control of Mercury and Nickel From Existing Sources: Electric Utility Steam-Generating Units; Proposed
Rule (Nov. 26, 2003), available on EPA’s online docket, in docket
number OAR-2002-0056. The note in the draft document stated:
“Insert text explaining why regulation under [§]111 adequately addresses the confirmed hazards to public health associated with Hg
and Ni emissions the environmental effects of HG when the [§]111
standards will be implemented somewhat later than the compliance
date for the MACT standards.”
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no such explanation appears in the proposal issued on January 30, 2004. Nowhere does EPA explain how §111 adequately addresses public health effects in light of the fact
that both the deadline and the emissions requirements of
§112 are stricter, if applied correctly, than those of §111.
EPA recognizes that its proposal may leave health effects
unaddressed. Thus, it offers to revisit the health consequences of mercury emissions from power plants after 2010
and 2018, the years that begin the two phases of its proposed
mercury trading program.121 One might observe that this
was exactly the sort of analysis EPA undertook six years
ago, when it reported to Congress in 1998 that mercury was
the most harmful of the hazardous air pollutants emitted by
power plants. Once again, delay, not protection of the public
health, appears to be what EPA is after.
Regulation Under §112
Section 112(c)(2) provides that once EPA has listed a category or subcategory under §112, the Agency “shall establish
emissions standards under subsection (d) of this section
. . . .”122 Nothing could be plainer: EPA’s December 2000
listing of power plants under §112 triggered an obligation to
regulate their emissions under §112.
Here, too, EPA’s arguments to the contrary are exceedingly weak. EPA states: “There is nothing in [§]112(n)(1)(A)
that requires an ‘appropriate and necessary’ finding to result in . . . regulation under [§]112(d).” Apparently, however, EPA missed the first part of the last sentence of
§112(n)(1)(A), which provides: “The Administrator shall
regulate electric utility steam-generating units under this
section,” upon making a finding that such regulation is
appropriate and necessary.123 EPA is quite right that
§112(n)(1)(A) directs EPA to study “the hazards to public
health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by electric utility steam-generating units of pollutants
listed under subsection (b) of this section after imposition of
the requirements of this chapter.”124 It is also correct that
§112(d)’s MACT standards do not in the first instance turn
on separate EPA findings of hazards to public health.125
However, these observations do not support EPA’s conclusion that §112(n) has ruled out MACT-based standards under §112(d) for mercury from power plants. Instead,
§112(n) merely requires EPA to make more specific than
usual findings regarding hazards to public health before pursuing regulation of mercury from power plants under the
rest of §112(d).
Even flimsier is EPA’s claim that §112(n)’s requirement
that EPA study “alternative control strategies” means that
§112(d) standards do not apply in the present circumstances.126 Nothing in §112(n) suggests that Congress meant
to direct EPA to do anything more than consider different
ways of reducing mercury from power plants under §112(d).
More important, this instruction to develop and consider alternatives does not suggest that Congress meant, through
such subtle and indirect language, wholly to wipe out EPA’s
121. 69 Fed. Reg. at 4686-87.
122. 42 U.S.C. §7412(c)(2).
123. Id. §7412(n)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. 69 Fed. Reg. at 4662.
126. Id. at 4661-62.
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obligation to regulate under §112(d) once it found regulation “appropriate and necessary” under §112(n).
Trading Under §112
Even if EPA were correct that §112(n) sets up its own regulatory framework for mercury emissions from power plants,
EPA nevertheless would not be allowed to set up a trading
program for mercury under §112(n). As noted above,
§112(n)’s references to “hazards to public health” and to “alternative control strategies” cannot reasonably be read to
take EPA outside the MACT framework set up by §112(d).
Moreover, just because, as EPA suggests, an emissions trading program for mercury might “dovetail[ ] well” with the
interstate air quality rule, does not mean that a cap-and-trade
program is allowed under §112(n). EPA also emphasizes
§112(n)’s reference to the requirements of other parts of the
CAA. The relevant passage in §112(n), however, makes
clear that other requirements of the Act are relevant only insofar as they affected the public health hazards EPA was directed to study in its 1998 report to Congress:
The Administrator shall perform a study of the hazards to
public health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result
of emissions by electric utility steam-generating units of
pollutants listed under subsection (b) of this section after
imposition of the requirements of this chapter.127

The reference to public health is not, nor can it be read to be,
a roving authority to install any kind of regulatory program
for mercury EPA likes so long as it fits conveniently with the
Agency’s other policy priorities.
Seemingly as an afterthought, EPA also suggests that perhaps it is not necessary, after all, to undo its finding that regulation of mercury is appropriate and necessary under
§112(n), because perhaps an emissions trading program
would be authorized by §112(d) itself.128 The Agency cites
no legal authority to support this proposition, and there is
none. As the classically command-and-control language of
§112 makes clear, and as its legislative history attests,129
§112 creates a technology-based regime. Nothing in the language or history of the section even remotely suggests that
emissions trading is one of the options contemplated by
§112. Indeed, §112(d)(2)’s fulsome catalogue of the kinds
of emission controls embraced by §112 is notable for its failure to include emissions trading as one of the regulatory options, despite the fact that at the same time Congress was
writing this language it was also enacting the nation’s firstever emissions trading program, to combat acid rain.
Trading Under §111
EPA’s third and final statutory source for an emissions trading program is §111, which establishes performance standards for new and existing sources of harmful air pollution.
EPA argues that the language of §111(a)(1), which refers to
the “best system of emissions reduction,” gives it the power
to adopt a cap-and-trade program for mercury emissions
from power plants.130 EPA is mistaken.
127. 42 U.S.C. §7412(n)(1)(A); 1998 EPA Hazardous Air Pollutant Study, supra note 107.
128. 69 Fed. Reg. at 4667.
129. Sierra Club v. EPA, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 348 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
130. 69 Fed. Reg. at 4686.
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Most notably, although §111 was amended in 1990 to
omit the requirement that §111 limits reflect technological
systems of emissions reduction, not a peep was heard from
Congress about the possibility that a trading regime could be
installed under §111. This silence, again, is significant in
light of the fact that Congress was at that very time enacting
our first trading program, in Title IV of the Act.
Section 111 clearly contemplates individualized, performance-based standards for sources covered by the provision. The provision is structured exactly like other performance-based limits found throughout the environmental
laws. Sources are divided into categories and subcategories—something that would make little sense if emissions
trading were contemplated, since subdivision could reduce
the efficiencies associated with trading. As with other performance-based systems, moreover, existing sources are
subject to §111’s requirements only when they make a physical change to their operations that results in emissions increases—again, a qualification that makes little sense where
trading is the governing framework.
In addition, §111(h) recognizes the performance-based
nature of the §111 standards by providing a contingency
plan in the event performance-based measures are “not feasible” to implement. In that case, §111(h) gives EPA the authority to “promulgate a design, equipment, work practice,
or operational standards, or combination thereof, which reflects the best technological system of continue emissions
reduction which . . . the Administrator determines has been
adequately demonstrated.”131 One of the ways a performance standard might prove “not feasible” is if “a pollutant or pollutants cannot be emitted through a conveyance
designed and constructed to emit or capture such pollutant
. . . .”132 Clearly, Congress thought the most likely scenario
under §111 was for pollutants to be “emitted through a
conveyance designed and constructed to emit or capture
such pollutant[s]”—an assumption at odds with EPA’s assertion of authority to construct a trading program under
§111.
Section 111 also provides good evidence that it is not
even a good source for hazardous air pollutant regulation,
let alone a source for hazardous air pollutant regulation
through a cap-and-trade program. Existing sources are controlled by §111(d), which requires EPA to set up a SIP-like
process for states to reduce pollution from sources in listed
categories. Before 1990, this provision required each state
to submit to EPA a plan which “establishes standards of performance for any existing source for any air pollutant (i) for
which air quality criteria have not been issued or which is
not included on a list published under [§]108(a) of this title
or [§]112(b)(1)(A) of this title but (ii) to which a standard of
performance under this section would apply if such existing
source were a new source. . . .”133
In 1990, Congress decided to alter the italicized language. Unfortunately, however, the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate did not agree about what the change
should look like. In the House version, the italicized language was changed to “or emitted from a source category
which is regulated under [§]112 of this title.”134 In the Sen131.
132.
133.
134.

42 U.S.C. §7411(h)(1).
Id. §7411(h)(2)(A).
Id. §7411(d)(1) (emphasis added).
Pub. L. No. 101-549, §108(g).

34 ELR 10310

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER
PREPUBLICATION COPY

ate version, the language was changed—in what the Senate
deemed a “conforming amendment,” meaning it was not intended to amend the substance of the provision—to “or
112(b) of this title.”135 The U.S. Code contains the House
version of the amendment. When it came time to print the
law in the Statutes at Large, however, the codifier reported
that this operation “could not be executed” because of the
two conflicting amendments. Thus, the Statutes at Large
contains both versions of the amendment, embraced by parentheses, as follows: states are to submit plans to EPA
which establish “standards of performance for any existing
source for any air pollutant . . . which is not included on a list
published under [§]7408(a) of this title (or emitted from a
source category which is regulated under [§]112 of this title) (or [§]112(b)).”136 In this kind of situation, the Statutes
at Large constitute the legal evidence of what the laws
say137—meaning, of course, that what the law says here
seems to be a jumble.
The difference in the language of the House and Senate
amendments to §111(d) has several possible implications.
Since the House did not label its amendment “conforming,”
it must have thought it was somehow changing the meaning
of the provision—thus inviting an interpretation different
from the “conforming” amendment offered by the Senate.
One might interpret the House language as precluding regulation under §111(d) only when a source category is actually
being regulated under §112. Under that interpretation,
EPA’s failure to regulate under §112 would give it the authority to regulate under §111 instead. However, given that
the purpose of the passage in question is obviously to restrict
application of §111 in deference to regulation under other
provisions of the Act, this interpretation seems strained at
best. Such an interpretation would allow EPA to choose the
more lenient §111 requirements over the requirements of
§112 the Act merely by failing to regulate under §112. This
interpretation would also directly contradict the Senate version of the §111 amendment, since the Senate’s version provides that §111 does not apply to pollutants listed under
§112. Another possibility is that the House version means
that if EPA were to regulate a hazardous air pollutant from a
source category under §112, that would preclude EPA from
regulating even non-hazardous air pollutants from that category under §111—leaving a regulatory vacuum that has no
apparent purpose under the Act.
It is hard to make precise sense of the language of §111(d)(1),
given the differing amendments brought into the provision
in 1990. One thing does seem clear, however: the provision
appears to contemplate that regulation under §111 will operate as a kind of last resort, after regulation under other provisions of the Act has failed to occur. It would seem most odd,
therefore, for EPA to interpret §111 as depriving EPA of authority to regulate under §112 as long as the regulatory possibilities under §111 have not been exhausted. Yet this is
precisely how EPA is proposing to interpret §111.
Coddling the Old Dirties
The odyssey of EPA’s abortive efforts to apply the requirements of CAA §112 to nine antiquated mercury cell
135. Id. §302.
136. 69 Fed. Reg. at 4685 (emphasis added).
137. Id. (citing 1 U.S.C. §204(a); United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 98
n.4 (1964)).
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chlor-alkali plants is discouraging for several reasons, the
most obvious of which is the fact that this small segment of
the chemical industry “loses” as much as 65 tons of mercury
each year during the manufacturing process.138 These 65
missing tons are not counted in the estimate that the United
States has 158 TPY in total mercury air emissions.139 The
companies claim that the missing mercury is safely trapped
in their plants’ piping; environmentalists say the mercury is
discharged as fugitive air emissions; and EPA acknowledges, without a hint of irony, that as far as it can tell, the fate
of these missing tons is an “enigma.”140 Considering the
controversy that erupted over controlling mercury air emissions from power plants, it is truly remarkable that virtually
no one noticed when EPA announced on December 19,
2003, that it had decided to coddle these nine “old dirties” to
the point that they can continue to operate indefinitely under
a system of regulatory “work practices” that are likely to
prove unenforceable.141 The effect of those requirements,
which have as their centerpiece visual inspections of the cell
room, is so uncertain that EPA is unable to set a numerical
limit for those fugitive emissions or estimate what amount
of reductions the new work practices will achieve.142
The nine facilities are so outmoded that a new one has not
been built in 30 years.143 Yet, given the opportunity to hasten
their departure from the field and achieve landmark mercury
reductions, EPA ducked, claiming that it had not obtained
enough information to even predict the reductions in fugitive emissions expected as a result of its work practice requirements.144 EPA’s shirking of its affirmative legal responsibility to remove MeHg from the environment may
have been motivated “top-down” by senior political appointees or it may have originated “bottom-up” from career
staff. Whichever theory of the Agency’s internal machinations one accepts, this episode reveals an EPA so thoroughly
dominated by industry resistance to regulation that it cannot
act effectively regardless of the urgency of the threat posed
to public health.
Unlike power plants, which emit mercury as the inevitable but unintended byproduct of burning coal, mercury cell
chlor-alkali facilities deliberately use large amounts of pure
138. In its proposed rule, EPA stated that there were 43 chlor-alkali facilities operating in the country, of which 11 used mercury cell technology. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants:
Mercury Emissions From Mercury Cell Chlor-Alkali Plants, Proposed Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 44672, 44680 (July 3, 2002) [hereinafter
Proposed Chlor-Alkali Rule]. In its final rule, the Agency did not repeat this breakdown, although it assumed in one set of figures that
nine plants remained in the mercury cell subcategory. Final
Chlor-Alkali Rule, supra note 2, at 70920 (assuming that if 65 tons
of missing mercury was allocated among the operating facilities
evenly, each would have “just over 7 tons”).
139. 1997 EPA Mercury Study, supra note 9, at 0-1 (estimating annual
emissions at 158).
140. Final Chlor-Alkali Rule, supra note 2, at 70920.
141. Id. at 70928-46 (text of final rule).
142. Id. at 70920 (“[D]ata are not available to establish a numerical emission standard for fugitive emissions.”); 70924 (“We are unable to
quantify the primary air emission impacts associated with the final
work practices standards . . . .”).
143. Proposed Chlor-Alkali Rule, supra note 138, at 44688 (reporting not
only that no mercury cell plants have been built in the United States
in 30 years but that EPA has “no indication of any plans for future
construction”).
144. Id. at 44684. (“Relative to emissions, we firmly believe that although we are unable to actually quantify the reductions expected
with the implementation of the beyond-the-floor option, substantial
reductions would nonetheless occur.”).
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mercury; as many as 350 tons are onsite at the typical
plant.145 The manufacturing process feeds liquid mercury in
a continuous loop through an electrolytic cell and a
decomposer, forming an electric charge that precipitates
chlorine gas out of saturated salt brine.146 Mercury use is intended to be “captive” in this process—that is, the mercury
is not intentionally added to finished products nor is it consumed as a catalyst.147 Rather, it is recycled continuously
with the goal of reusing all of the virgin materials fed into
the system. Nevertheless, as EPA acknowledges, such
plants lose significant amounts of mercury all along the
way:
Mercury is emitted from two point sources [at such
plants]—the end box ventilation system and the
by-product hydrogen system. Mercury is also emitted
from mercury thermal recovery units, which is [sic] also
a point source. In addition there are mercury fugitive
emissions from the cell rooms and from the waste recovery areas.148

Thirty-two of the approximately 43 facilities that manufacture chlorine and caustic use diaphragm or membrane
cells, which are significantly more energy efficient and do
not use mercury.149 However, rather than define the “source
category” under §112 as all chlor-alkali facilities, making
MACT the far cleaner diaphragm and membrane cell technologies, EPA chose to isolate the nine mercury cell facilities into their own subcategory, transforming their outmoded manufacturing process into MACT.150 As legal justification for this decision, the Agency cited its “broad discretion” to define subcategories under the Act, whenever there
are “technical distinctions among classes, types, or sizes of
sources” that would “impact setting an appropriate emission
limit even when creating the subcategories leads to some
with a small number of sources.”151 This permissive approach cannot be what Congress intended when it firmly set
the Agency on a different path toward controlling hazardous
air pollutants close to 15 years ago.152 So minimal is the final
rule that it will impose “plant-specific annual costs” ranging
from $130,000 to $260,000, which in turn amount to from
0.01 to 0.22 % of their owners’ annual revenues.153
EPA’s final rule sets numerical limitations on emissions
from the three point sources identified above—the end-box,
hydrogen, and thermal recovery systems—but does not set
standards for fugitive emissions from cell rooms or waste
recovery areas.154 Nevertheless, the Agency claims it will
reduce mercury air emissions by 3,068 kg—or about three
145. EPA buries this startling fact in a garbled explanation of why it has
no idea what happens to the lost mercury, noting that each of the nine
plants lost seven tons of mercury which is “less than 2[%]” of the
amount on-site at such facilities. Final Chlor-Alkali Rule, supra note
2, at 70920.
146. Id. at 70907.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Again, these figures are derived from the preamble to EPA’s proposed rule, and do not conform to the assumption in its final rule that
only 9 of the 11 remaining facilities using mercury cells are still in
operation. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
150. Final Chlor-Alkali Rule, supra note 2, at 70918.
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 88-137 and accompanying text.
153. Final Chlor-Alkali Rule, supra note 2, at 70924-25.
154. Proposed Chlor-Alkali Rule, supra note 138, at 44691.
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tons—annually beyond the levels allowed under the 1973
rule.155 Even if you accept the Agency’s estimate at face
value, simple math tells the rest of the tale.
The companies using mercury cell technology bought
about 160 TPY of virgin mercury between 1990-1995, but
this amount fell to 79 TPY in 2000 and then to 30 TPY in
2001.156 These fluctuations likely reflect changes in the
market for chlorine products and are not dependable from an
environmental perspective, although EPA seized on them in
justifying its decision, claiming that they reflect an overall
“significant decrease from baseline levels.”157 Whether or
not the industry’s productivity grows back to 1995 levels,
EPA accepted the argument made by environmental organizations that the 2001 figure of 30 TPY in virgin mercury
purchases was so low that it was likely an outlier, instead using the 2000 figure of 79 TPY in explaining its rationale for
adopting the final rule.158 The Agency noted that mercury
cell facilities reported toxic release inventory (TRI) numbers totaling 14 tons in 2000, leaving 65 tons “of consumed
mercury that is not accounted for in the year 2000.”159 At its
best, then, assuming that work practices are faithfully followed and EPA takes effective enforcement against negligent firms, EPA’s final rule addresses three tons of this total,
providing the industry with the windfall opportunity to continue losing at the astounding rate of 62 TPY. In essence, the
best bet for public health and the environment threatened by
fugitive emissions is either that all the missing mercury is
miraculously trapped in its pipes, or that this segment of the
industry will prove unprofitable and shut down.
EPA’s struggle to rationalize its way out of this conundrum is both labored and pitiful. In responding to comments
as it issued the final rule, the Agency asserted that environmental organization commenters provided “little empirical
evidence to support” the conclusion that the missing mercury escapes the system in fugitive emissions.160 On the
other hand, it said, while “industry personnel” claim the
mercury “condenses and accumulates in pipes, tanks, and
other plant equipment,” the industry “is also unable to fully
substantiate their theory.”161 By then thoroughly confused
by the lack of reliable information, EPA observed that
mercury is a very heavy metal—one gallon weighs 113
pounds.162 If each of the nine plants is missing seven tons
annually, continued the Agency in a classic example of non
sequitur reasoning, “124 gallons of mercury would be unaccounted for per plant.”163 But, it asserted, “[t]his is a very
small percentage (less than 2[%]) of the amount of mercury
typically on site at most facilities.”164 At this inconclusive
point, the Agency figuratively throws up its hands, concluding that “the fate of all the mercury consumed at mercury
cell chlor-alkali plants remains something of an enigma.”165
There are six companies that still operate mercury cell
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Final Chlor-Alkali Rule, supra note 2, at 70904.
Id. at 70920.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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chlor-alkali facilities. In a press release issued on December
22, 2003, the NRDC identified them, their plants’ location,
and the water bodies potentially affected by these emissions as:

Nine Remaining Mercury Cell Chlor-Alkali Plants
Company
Ashta Chemicals,
Inc.
Occidental Chemical
Corp.
Occidental Chemical
Corp.
Olin Corp.
Olin Corp.
PPG Industries
PPG Industries
Pioneer Americas
L.L.C.
Vulcan Materials
Co.

Plant Location
Ashtabula,
Ohio
Muscle Shoals,
Ala.
Delaware City,
Del.
August,
Ga.
Charleston,
Tenn.
Lake Charles,
La.

4-2004

Ironically, the mystification expressed by EPA staff in
charge of the mercury cell chlor-alkali rule regarding the
significance of the nine plants’ mercury emissions is not
shared by their colleagues in Region 4, leaving one to hope
that they will one day speak to each other. In February 2001,
EPA Region 4 issued a TMDL for Total Mercury in Fish Tissue Residue in the Middle and Lower Savannah River Watershed.166 The top four sources included:

Water Bodies
Lake Erie,
Ashtabula River
Pond Creek,
Tennessee River
Red Lion Creek,
Delaware River
Savannah River
Hiwassee River

New Martinsville,
W.Va.
Saint Gabriel,
La.
Port Edwards,
Wis.

Bayou d’Inde
Calcasieu River
Estuary
Ohio River
Mississippi River
Wisconsin River

Memorandum to Reporters and Editorial Writers from Jon Devine and Linda
Greer, NRDC, Chlorine Plant Mercury Pollution: Where Did It Go? (Dec. 22,
2004) (copy on file with authors).

Sources of Mercury Contamination in the Middle and Lower Savannah River Watershed
Number
of Sources

Total HG
Emissions
Baseline
Period (kg/yr)

% of Total Hg

% of Total Hg
Emitted in the
RGM Airshed

Total RGM
Emissions Baseline

% of Total
RGM

36

963

25.65

73

703

39.93

Power Plants

17

866

23.08

30

260

14.76

Chlor-Alkali

1

597

15.92

30

179

10.18

3

589

15.69

60

353

20.08

Source
Category

Medical
Waste
Incinerators

Municipal
Waste
Combustors

U.S. EPA, U.S. EPA Region 4, TMDL for Total Mercury in Fish Tissue Residue in the Middle and Lower Savannah River Watershed, at 28 (Feb. 28, 2001).

166. U.S. EPA Region 4, Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) for Total Mercury in Fish Tissue Residue in the Middle and Lower Savannah River Watershed (Feb. 28, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/Region4/water/tmdl/georgia/final/savannah_hg_final.pdf.
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The estimate that the Olin Corporation plant emits 597 kg
(about two-thirds of a ton) of mercury annually probably
does not take into account fugitive emissions from the facility’s cell room, which could have added as much as seven
tons more to this estimate. Still, this single facility is identified among the top four contributors to mercury contamination of Savannah River fish.
As for the likelihood that the work practices promulgated
by EPA will produce adequate reductions, they are likely to
be only as good as the environmental ethic of the company
involved or, in the absence of such an ethic, EPA enforcement. As for environmental ethics, two of the nine facilities
are already under EPA enforcement orders at the moment.
On February 28, 2002, EPA Region 5 announced that the
Ashta Chemical facility in Ashtabula, Ohio, paid a fine of
$239,800 for poorly operating air pollution control equipment.167 And the Occidental Chemical chlor-alkali facility
in Delaware City, Delaware, has been cleaning up its site under a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act corrective
action order since 1991, the majority of which dealt with
mercury contamination of soil, including stormwater drainage channels.168
167. Press Release, U.S. EPA Region 5, EPA Reaches Agreement With
Ashta Chemicals; Includes $239,800 Penalty, available at http://
www.epa.gov/Region5/newsnews02/02opa031.htm.
168. U.S. EPA Region 3, GPRA Baseline RCRA Corrective Action Facil-
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So, what do we have in the final analysis? The mercury is
missing and EPA has no idea where it went. EPA knows that
the nine facilities buy, store, and use as much as 70 TPY of
pure mercury. Yet the Agency is not motivated to find out
what happens to this mercury at the end of the manufacturing process. As a sop to environmentalists, the final rule
asks the nine facilities to report the mass of virgin mercury
added to cells in the five years preceding the rule’s compliance date of December 19, 2006.169 It makes no promises
that it will ever do anything in response to this information.
The Next Wave
Mercury is bad for people, and the law requires that it be
strictly regulated. EPA’s lenient proposals to regulate mercury from power plants and mercury cell chlor-alkali facilities flout these scientific and legal realities. In the second
part of this Article, we consider the economic analysis underlying, and distributional implications of, EPA’s mercury
policies, and find that the policies fall flat on the grounds of
economics and justice as well as on the grounds of science
and law.
ity, Occidental Chemical Corporation, at epa.gov/reg3wcmd/ca/de/
pdf/ded003913266.pdf (last modified May 20, 2003).
169. Final Chlor-Alkali Rule, supra note 2, at 70921.

